Government liabilities for disaster risk in industrialized countries: a case study of Australia by Hochrainer-Stigler, S. et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tenh20
Environmental Hazards
ISSN: 1747-7891 (Print) 1878-0059 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tenh20
Government liabilities for disaster risk in
industrialized countries: a case study of Australia
Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler, Adriana Keating, John Handmer & Monique Ladds
To cite this article: Stefan Hochrainer-Stigler, Adriana Keating, John Handmer & Monique Ladds
(2018): Government liabilities for disaster risk in industrialized countries: a case study of Australia,
Environmental Hazards, DOI: 10.1080/17477891.2018.1426554
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2018.1426554
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 21 Jan 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Government liabilities for disaster risk in industrialized
countries: a case study of Australia
Stefan Hochrainer-Stiglera, Adriana Keatinga, John Handmerb and Monique Laddsc
aIIASA-International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; bRisk & Community Safety,
Department of Maths and Geoscience, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia; cSchool of Mathematics and
Statistics, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
ABSTRACT
This paper explores sovereign risk preferences against direct and
indirect natural disasters losses in industrialized countries. Using
Australia as a case study, the analysis compares expected disaster
losses and government capacity to finance losses. Utilizing a
national disaster loss dataset, extreme value theory is applied to
estimate an all-hazard annual loss distribution. Unusually but
critically, the dataset includes direct as well as indirect losses,
allowing for the analysis to consider the oft-ignored issue of
indirect losses. Expected annual losses (direct, and direct plus
indirect) are overlaid with a risk-layer approach, to distinguish low,
medium and extreme loss events. Each risk layer is compared to
available fiscal resources for financing losses, grounded in the
political reality of Australian disaster financing. When considering
direct losses only, we find support for a risk-neutral preference on
the part of the Australian government for low and medium loss
levels, and a risk-averse preference in regard to extreme losses.
When indirect losses are also estimated, we find that even
medium loss levels are expected to overwhelm available fiscal
resources, thereby violating the available resources assumption
underlying arguments for sovereign risk neutrality. Our analysis
provides empirical support for the assertion that indirect losses
are a major, under-recognised concern for industrialized countries.
A risk-averse preference in regard to medium and extreme loss
events recommends enhanced investment in both corrective and
prospective risk reduction in relation to these risks level, in
particular to reduce indirect losses.
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1. Introduction
The recent Global Assessment Reports on disaster risk (UNISDR, 2013, 2015a, 2017) issued
a stark warning that economic losses linked to disasters will continue to escalate unless
there is a significant increase in investment in risk reduction, and disaster risk manage-
ment becomes a core part of investment strategies. Globally, the need to proactively redir-
ect growth in asset exposure and plan for disaster events under differential vulnerability
is increasingly prominent in the discussion on disaster risk management (IPCC, 2012;
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Welle & Birkmann, 2015). The recent Sendai Framework for risk reduction stated that
countries should adopt a concise, focused and forward-looking framework for disaster
risk reduction (UNISDR, 2015b). Similarly, the Global Risk Report published by the World
Economic Forum (2014) concluded that better efforts are needed to understand,
measure and foresee the evolution of interconnected risk, e.g. global trade and food net-
works (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, & Jason Windawi, 2015). Part of this paradigm
shift calling for a more proactive approach can be explained by the fact that disaster
risk has increasingly been recognized as a major challenge to economic growth and
overall societal well-being (Uitto & Shaw, 2016).
Key private sector stakeholders in disaster risk management include property owners,
insurers and re-insurers, as well as the capital market (Grossi & Kunreuther, 2005).
Especially in industrialized countries, the private sector (re)insurance system is a major
source of funding for disaster recovery (Noy, Kusuma, & Nguyen, 2017). From the
public-sector perspective, governments are now key players (Cardenas, Hochrainer,
Mechler, Pflug, & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2007; IPCC, 2012). Governments are usually respon-
sible for covering a significant part of public-sector total disaster losses due to their explicit
(e.g. infrastructure restoration) or implicit (e.g. insurer of last resort) liabilities (Mitchell,
Mechler, & Peters, 2014). As evidenced following the Christchurch, New Zealand earth-
quake in 2011, governments are also responsible for ensuring that affected economies
make a full recovery. Different options exist for governments to finance disaster losses
and they are usually grouped into ex-post, i.e. after the event, or ex-ante, i.e. proactive,
instruments (Gurenko, 2004). For example, after an event the government may divert
budget or take loans; use dedicated contingency reserves such as catastrophe funds; or
activate insurance arrangements which are set up ex-ante to finance the losses (a compre-
hensive list of options can be found in Ghesquiere and Mahul (2007).
This paper focuses on national governments in industrialized countries, exploring the
need for proactive investment in ex-ante risk reduction and contingency planning.
Using Australia as a case study, we ask when and how governments should invest in
ex-ante risk-financing measures. We show that the substantial fiscal and economic risks
associated with disasters, and an absence of proactive risk management, are not only a
concern for developing countries; wealthy and developed countries, such as Australia,
are potentially subject to substantial and unacknowledged risk, which proposes a signifi-
cant threat to government fiscal stability and medium to long-term economic growth. We
conclude that instead of direct losses – which are of primary interest in the developing
country context – for developed countries indirect losses pose a substantial risk and
hence should be considered when determining the need of proactive investment. Further-
more, we suggest that a risk-layer approach may be helpful to group management instru-
ments according to different risk levels a country is exposed to.
Government ex-ante risk-financing options each have advantages as well as disadvan-
tages. Particularly pertinent to this discussion is sovereign risk preference, or how risk
averse a government is. Governments who are risk averse are inclined to minimize risks
to themselves and society even when such costs exceed the annual expected costs of dis-
aster events. In the seminal paper by Arrow and Lind (1970) on the role of sovereign risk
preference, the authors proposed that governments should behave risk-neutrally, as they
are considered the entity best suited to deal with risk via efficiently pooling and spreading
potential losses. Specifically, the argument did not favour neglecting risk, rather Arrow and
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Lind suggested a fiscal management approach based on expected values only: ‘[…] the
government should behave as an expected-value decision maker’ (Arrow & Lind, 1970,
p. 366). This means governments, because they can afford to refinance quickly, should
only plan for and reserve for average costs incurred over a longer time horizon, and
thus do not need to pay close attention to variability in costs.
Arrow and Lind (1970) themselves express many caveats to the government risk-neu-
trality assumption (for a general discussion on the Arrow-Lind Theorem, see Gopalakrish-
nan (2014)). Here we address the arguments in relation to extremes. Hochrainer and Pflug
(2009) have shown that in theory, the Arrow-Lind Theorem fails in relation to extremes.
Mechler (2004) analysed qualitatively which assumptions violated the Arrow-Lind
Theorem for extremes and identified circumstances under which it is justifiable for govern-
ments to act as risk-averse agents; most important here are circumstances where there are
constraints on resources for financing disaster losses and associated requirements. We are
therefore interested in situations where expected damages might overwhelm resources
for financing losses. To investigate this, Cardona, Ordaz, Reinoso, Yamín, and Barbat.
(2012) and Hochrainer-Stigler, Mechler, and Mochizuki (2015) propose an approach
which compares the financing resources available for the government with the risk (in
terms of probability) of experiencing losses. The key motivator behind this approach is
that disaster events which exceed financial coping capacity will cause additional and sub-
stantial indirect, long-term effects, e.g. business interruption. As the government cannot
go bankrupt in the sense that it disappears (like businesses in markets) it should take
these costs explicitly into account in its decision-making. In other words, a government
should behave in a risk-averse manner for all risks (direct and indirect) it cannot cope
with by utilizing all currently available resources.
Taking such a risk-based approach has several advantages, including that it can help
identify sovereign risk preference by comparing available financing for disaster losses
and expected annual loss. For example, while absolute direct losses (i.e. losses caused
by the natural hazard event itself) may be high in industrialized countries, available finan-
cial resources are usually large enough to cope with losses. On the other hand, in devel-
oping countries direct losses may be small in absolute terms, but they are difficult to cope
with due to lack of available financial resources. Consequently, in developing countries risk
aversion can be expected even for very small risks (in terms of losses) while in industrial-
ized countries risk aversion is very often recommended for events with very large direct
losses (Hochrainer-Stigler et al., 2015).
When conceptualizing and estimating expected losses from disasters, the focus to date
has been on direct losses. This is because direct losses are the most visible and straightfor-
ward to estimate, hence the vast majority of disaster loss data accounts for direct losses
only. While a risk-based approach for direct losses can give important insights on sover-
eign risk preferences, we argue that for industrialized countries indirect losses from disas-
ters have to be explicitly considered. Without the incorporation of indirect losses, the
cumulative effects of potential disasters are missed and government fiscal risk is drastically
underestimated. A comprehensive estimation of government fiscal risk is required for
determining levels of sovereign risk aversion and subsequently the appropriate level of
investment in proactive disaster risk management. We claim that this is especially relevant
for industrialized countries as their relative availability of financial resources may bias the
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view towards a low financial vulnerability to disasters while in actuality, due to indirect
consequences, they are highly vulnerable.
We estimate available financial resources and expected annual loss including both
direct and indirect effects for Australia, gaining insight into the need for increased
investment in ex-ante risk reduction. In this way we demonstrate our approach using
Australia as a case study where (as in many other industrialized countries) there is
an expectation that in the event of a disaster funds will be available for immediate
humanitarian support, reconstruction and the ongoing costs to ensure affected commu-
nities and economies recover quickly and well. In other words, we assume that govern-
ments are responsible – via explicit or implicit liabilities – for all or part of the costs
associated with direct and indirect impacts of the disaster.
The estimation of economic indirect effects due to natural disasters is still very chal-
lenging and far from resolved (see Hallegatte & Przyluski, 2010). Most studies dealing
with this issue utilize macro-economic modelling approaches, which can only estimate
average indirect effects, or effects under a limited number of scenarios (Cavallo & Noy,
2011). In this paper, instead of using a modelling approach we apply extreme value
statistics (Embrechts, Klüppelberg, & Mikosch, 2013) to a recently produced dataset
of direct and indirect losses for Australia. This enables a risk-based comparison of finan-
cing needs for all potential hazard events at the national level, considering both direct
and indirect effects. We then apply a so-called risk-layer approach where we distinguish
between different event probabilities. Our analysis finds that for the case of Australia
there is a need for proactive, ex-ante risk management even for medium-level risks
(50–100 year return periods), due to high indirect losses. We show that the substantial
fiscal and economic risks associated with disasters, and an absence of proactive risk
management, are not only a concern for developing countries; wealthy and developed
countries, such as Australia, are potentially subject to substantial and unacknowledged
risk, which proposes a significant threat to government fiscal stability and medium to
long-term economic growth.
In the next section we first structure our discussion around the concept of contingent
liabilities. We then introduce how we model the risk of extreme events, and ways to incor-
porate risk management instruments within a risk-layer approach. We then describe the
database for the case study application. Section 3 presents our estimates of expected
losses and government capacity to cover these losses, and compares them within the
risk-layering framework. Section 4 discusses our findings and Section 5 concludes.
2. Theory, methods and data
2.1. Contingent liabilities
Identification of government liabilities exposed due to disaster events is the first step
towards understanding possible consequences for government fiscal stability. Govern-
ments typically plan and budget for direct liabilities, that is, liabilities that manifest them-
selves through certain and annually recurrent expenditures. These liabilities can be termed
explicit (as recognized by law or contract); however, implicit liabilities (e.g. due to moral
obligations or public expectations) should also be assumed. In contrast to direct liabilities,
costs associated with disaster event losses enter the balance sheet as contingent liabilities
(marked in italics in Table 1), i.e. obligations that arise only when an event occurs. Here one
4 S. HOCHRAINER-STIGLER ET AL.
can also distinguish between explicit and implicit liabilities. Explicit contingent liabilities
are those costs that deal with the reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed by events
for which the government is explicitly responsible for. In contrast, disaster-related implicit
contingent obligations are associated with providing relief and ensuring that affected
communities and economies continue to function well – commonly considered as a
moral liability for governments. We restrict our attention in this paper to explicit and
implicit contingent liabilities (of national governments).
If a disaster event occurs the government can expect contingent explicit and implicit
liabilities (either due to direct or indirect losses), which it needs to finance through ex-
post measures such as budget diversion. However in contrast, for a proactive approach
the contingent liabilities due to extremes need to change from contingent liabilities to
direct ones, which requires that they can be properly defined so that they can be ade-
quately quantified. In order to do this they must be assessed in a risk-based manner. In
other words, potential future losses and their corresponding probabilities must be esti-
mated, which we discuss next.
2.2. Assessing risks from extremes
There are two general approaches to a probabilistic assessment of risk from extreme
events: (1) catastrophe modelling, and (2) applying extreme value theory (EVT) using
data from past events. Within a catastrophe model, disaster risk is modelled as a function
of the hazard, the exposed elements and their physical vulnerability (Woo, 2011). A cata-
strophe modelling approach is extremely data intensive; the hazard, exposure and vulner-
ability modules all require data which are not typically available for multiple hazards at the
national scale – which is the scale of our analysis. Furthermore, the data availability
problem is compounded by the fact that extreme risks are particularly difficult to
model. This is because of the paucity of data points representing extreme events in the
past, which are by definition rare.
The alternative to catastrophe models is to use data on past loss events and apply EVT
and statistics to estimate extreme risk (Embrechts et al., 2013). It should be noted that the
methods used in EVT for dealing with extreme risk are quite different from the usual
assessment of frequent risks. In particular, much real-world data follow a normal distri-
bution and the estimation of distributional parameters can be done based on the assump-
tions associated with such a distribution (Reiss & Thomas, 2007). However, for extremes,
Table 1. Governments’ explicit and implicit, direct and contingent liabilities.
Liabilities Direct obligation in any event Contingent obligation if a particular event occurs
Explicit
Government liability
recognized by law or contract
. Foreign and domestic
sovereign borrowing,
. Expenditures by budget law
and budget expenditures
. State guarantees for non-sovereign
borrowing and public and private sector
entities
. Reconstruction of public assets
Implicit
A ‘moral’ obligation of the
government
. Pension and health care
expenditure
. Future recurrent costs of public
investment projects
. Default of subnational government or public
or private entities,
. Banking failure
. Disaster relief and recovery assistance
. Ensuring that affected economies continue to
function well
Note: DRM relevant items in italics. Source: Modified after Polackova Brixi, and Mody (2002).
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the tails are much fatter than classical distributions predict and while standard density esti-
mation techniques fit well where data have the greatest density, they can be severely
biased for estimating tail probabilities. As we use an EVT approach here we provide
more detail about the estimation procedure below.
EVT deals with the stochastic behaviour of the maximum (or minimum) of independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. The distributional properties of
extremes (maximum or minimum) are determined by the upper (or lower) tails of the
underlying distribution and can be evaluated by means of statistical procedures.
Extreme value distributions are obtained as limiting distributions of (standardized)
maximum values in random samples of increasing size. For example, Fisher and Tippett
(1928) have shown that the distribution of the maximum (if not degenerate, i.e. a distri-
bution which only takes a single value) can only be one of three types (the Gumbel, the
Weibull or the Frechet distribution). Especially for the purposes of statistical estimation,
a one-parameter representation of the three standard cases in one family is very useful.
Jenkinson’s (1955) introduction of the Generalized Extreme Value distribution given
below is widely accepted in the literature as the standard representation for extreme risk.
Definition 1. (Jenkinson, 1955): The generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution is
defined by
Hj(x) = exp (−(1+ jx)
1/j) if j= 0
exp (− exp (− x)) if j = 0
{
,
where 1+ξx > 0 and ξ is called the shape parameter.
The classic statistical modelling approaches for estimating the extreme value par-
ameters are the so-called ‘Block Maxima’ and the ‘Peaks over Threshold’ methods
(Embrechts et al., 2013). The Block Maxima approach is usually applied for estimating
the GEV as shown in Definition 1 above. The observation period is divided into non-over-
lapping time periods of equal size and attention is restricted to the maximum value within
each period or block – hence ‘block maxima’ – e.g. days, months or even years. However, a
key problem arises when using this approach: the total sample tends to be reduced con-
siderably and estimations are then based on only a few data points. To avoid such pro-
blems the Peaks over Threshold approach can also be applied. For this method data
points which are above some threshold level, say u, are examined. In the case where a
non-degenerate distribution exists, a distributional approximation for the scaled excesses
over the high threshold u can be formulated which gives rise to the following definition of
a Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD):
Definition 2. The generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) is defined as
Gj(x) = 1− (1+ jx)
−1/j if j= 0,
1− e−x if j = 0,
{
where x≥ 0 if ξ≥ 0 and 0≤ x ≤−1/ξ if ξ < 0.
For more details about the theoretical background as well as statistical assumptions
needed to apply the EVT or catastrophe modelling methodology, see Reiss and Thomas
(2007), Woo (2011) and the seminal book by Embrechts et al. (2013). What is critical to
note here is that the outputs of both catastrophe modelling and EVT approaches are ana-
logous – they both are able to produce an annual loss distribution, i.e. the x-axis represents
losses in monetary terms, while the y-axis represents the probability that losses do not
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exceed a given level of damage (therefore sometimes also called the ‘event axis’). For
example, a value of 0.98 on the event axis means that with a probability of 98% the
annual losses will be smaller or equal to x. Or in other words, there is a probability of 1
in 50 per year that losses will exceed this level of damage (see as an example Figure 3).
The same principle can be used for all other events. The loss distribution itself is tremen-
dously important for risk management purposes because various risk measures can be cal-
culated from it, e.g. average annual losses and losses for various return periods (see Pflug &
Roemisch, 2007). Estimating a loss distribution enables the determination of the expected
return on various risk reduction investments (Mechler et al., 2014). It also enables one to
determine risk layers and possible associated risk reduction and management strategies,
as discussed next.
2.3. Risk layering
A comprehensive disaster risk management strategy requires investment in reducing risks
and risk financing, as well as investments in both ex-ante and ex-post disaster manage-
ment. Finding the right balance between these investments is not a straightforward prop-
osition. This is because the ideal mix depends on the wider costs and benefits of the
different activities, their complex interactions (e.g. financial instruments, through incen-
tives, can influence prevention activities) and their social acceptability. Costs and benefits,
in turn, depend on the nature of the hazard, exposure and vulnerability. The risk-layering
approach (Figure 1) has been proposed as one way to conceptualize the relationship
between risk and the appropriateness of disaster risk management investment options
(Linnerooth-Bayer & Hochrainer-Stigler, 2015).
Figure 1. The layering approach for risk reduction and risk financing using a loss distribution. Source:
Adapted after Mechler et al. (2014).
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For the low- to medium-loss events that happen relatively frequently, risk reduction
is likely to be cost-effective for reducing burdens. This is because the costs of risk
reduction often increase disproportionately with the severity of the consequences.
Moreover, individuals and governments are generally better able to finance the
impacts from lower consequence disasters from their own means, such as savings or
budget reserves, then utilizing risk-financing instruments for the middle- and high-
risk layers were their own capacity to finance is limited. For this reason, it is generally
advisable to reserve risk-financing instruments for lower probability/higher impact dis-
asters that have debilitating consequences (catastrophes). Finally, as shown in the
uppermost layer of Figure 1, individuals and governments will generally find it too
costly to use even risk-financing instruments against very extreme risks occurring less
frequently than, say, every 500 years.
To-date estimates of risk layers have primarily been derived from loss distributions
which account for direct risk only (Figure 1). In other words, they account for losses
which are caused by the disaster event itself, and do not include indirect and long-
term consequences. We argue that the inclusion of these losses within a risk-layer
approach may be beneficial for determining appropriate options. This is because
they provide fuller information on levels of risk exposed and what additional options
may be appropriate for mitigating these risks (e.g. increase of redundancies to decrease
the risk of network effects such as cascading events). Relatedly, we argue that consid-
ering direct risks only vastly overestimates financing capacity. Hence, an inclusion of
indirect losses within a risk-layer approach gives important additional details about
which risks are estimated to overwhelm limited financing resources. We will demon-
strate this through a case study example for Australia which is based on a recently pro-
duced unique dataset discussed next.
2.4. Country-level disaster data: the Australian disaster cost database
There is a strong demand for information on losses from natural disasters in Australia from
policy-makers, researchers and the community to help estimate the current and potential
risk (Ladds, Keating, Handmer, & Magee, 2017). This demand has been partly satisfied by
the 2001 BTE (Bureau of Transport Economics) report: The Economic Costs of Natural Dis-
asters in Australia. There is also a major proprietary dataset held by Risk Frontiers which is
mainly concerned with insurance issues, a dataset from ICA (Insurance Council of Australia)
on insurance losses from 1967–present (publicly available until mid 2014), and EM Knowl-
edge (previously EMATrack). EM Knowledge is a long running dataset on disaster loss in
Australia, but it is not suitable for trend analysis, and is largely dependent on media
reports and the ICA database. In addition, many agencies hold time-series data on
losses from fires (and others hazards), but these are usually neither continuous nor com-
prehensive records, nor available outside the agency concerned. Of these sources, the
2001 BTE report is the only publicly available consistent time-series of full disaster loss
by hazard and by all Australian jurisdictions. The ICA dataset is consistent but deals only
with insurance payouts and no metadata are available. This insurance dataset includes
events with at least 10 million dollars in loss, and was used by BTE (2001).
However, the BTE report is very dated. To address this, an update project was funded by
an NEMP (Australian National Emergency Management Projects) grant. The project
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updated the disaster loss data as well as the thinking underpinning the analysis presented
in the 2001 report. The new database, called AUS-DIS (Ladds, Magee, & Handmer, 2015),
covers reported Australian disaster losses from 1967 through to 2013. It drew on a
number of local and international sources with clear metadata, explicit sourcing and
reliability estimates for each data-point. Under the criteria of >$10 million or three fatal-
ities, there are 313 disasters over the period covered by the dataset. The database is to
be available on request. The loss estimates were normalized according to the consumer
price indices and other dimensions including population and exposure (see Ladds et al.,
2017 for more details). Loss estimates for each event include (1) insured losses; (2) reported
losses; and (3) total losses.
Insured losses, as the name suggests, represent the value of insurance claims awarded
as a result of the disaster. Insurance losses are typically considered a very limited subset of
all losses since they only represent losses which have been insured; in the case of the AUS-
DIS dataset, insured losses represent only insurance payments awarded to households, not
businesses. Reported losses represent ‘direct’ economic losses, which arise from the
destruction or damage of physical assets due to the hazard event. Total losses represent
direct (reported) losses plus indirect losses, where indirect losses are changes to flows of
goods and services, including business disruption, that are much more difficult to assess.
These are made up of emergency response, disruption to households, disruption to
business, disruption to public services, disruption to agriculture, road transport delays
and disruption to other networks (e.g. ports, bridges, rail). We use all three loss variables
for our analysis.
3. Results
Our analysis begins with a fiscal risk assessment of Australia by examining the current
risk management practices of the Australian government. We then utilize EVT to esti-
mate a loss distribution using the AUS-DIS database. Finally, the two are combined to
identify potential risk management options within the risk-layer framework. All figures
described below are estimated using Ladds et al.’s (2015) AUS-DIS database (see also
Ladds et al., 2017).
3.1. Risk-financing instruments and liabilities in Australia
Losses due to natural disaster events in Australia are high, and this is true for the private as
well as public-sector risk bearers. For example, from 1970 to 2013 (household) insured
losses exceeded 21 billion USD, with an annual average loss rate around 500 million
USD. While insurance usually only covers private-sector asset losses, government fiscal
costs include a variety of expenditures at different levels of government and activities
related to pre- and post-disaster management. As is typical around the world, pre-disaster
investment in risk reduction is much lower than post-disaster expenditure on response
and recovery. From 2002 to 2015, approximately 96% of Australian Government disas-
ter-related expenditure was on post-disaster initiatives, amounting to more than 13
billion USD, with the National Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA)
accounting for the bulk of the expenditure. However, at the state and territory level, the
proportion of disaster-related expenditure spent on post-disaster initiatives varies
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considerably, ranging from 40 to over 90% (NDFA, 2014a). State and territory govern-
ments’ NDRRA expenditure, which is not reimbursed by the national government, is
shared among jurisdictions through a so-called process of horizontal fiscal equalization.
For example, the high expenditures in Queensland in recent years are partially balanced
out by receiving a higher amount of the nationally collected GST (Goods and Services
Tax, collected and distributed by the Federal Government) redistribution in subsequent
years (NDFA, 2014b). As Figure 2 indicates, different risk bearers at various scales, including
households, business, governments at different levels and the broader community, have
different responsibilities, and funding and financing options when it comes to risk
reduction (mitigation) and recovery, including insurance, in Australia.
The NDRRA has undergone various changes over time as new policies have been added
and determinations have been released, including its scope and eligibility (for more
details, see Pikusa, 2015). Furthermore, the Australian Government Disaster Recovery
Payment (AGDRP) provides immediate relief assistance to private-sector entities and
therefore also takes some responsibility for the private sector (see Table 1), although it
does so with very modest funds. For comparative purposes, between 2009 and 2013
relief and recovery expenditure was 5.9 billion USD for the NDRRA and 1.1 billion for
the AGDRP (NDFA, 2014b). While the various state and territory governments in Australia
have various financing options, including insurance facilities which transfer risk to the
international financial system, our focus is on the national (federal) level which usually
has to bear the largest burden and also responsibility (as insurer of last resort) in the
event of large disasters.
Apart from the funding instruments, their use and resource availability in the past, the
critical question for proactive risk management is what level of resources could be avail-
able in a most optimistic setting. Unfortunately, such information is difficult to gather, in
part due to the lack of available estimation methodologies. To the authors’ knowledge
there is only one broad-brush approach available, by Hochrainer-Stigler, Mechler, Pflug,
and Williges (2014), which presents one possible estimation procedure. The approach esti-
mates available fiscal resources separated into diversion from budget, and the possibilities
to gain loans. Applied to Australia, such an analysis indicates that currently a maximum of
around 10 billion USD could be diverted from the budget, and around 16 billion USD could
be taken in credit form, totalling around 26 billion USD annually. This is approximately
twice the amount of Australian government disaster-related expenditure made available
from 2002 till 2015. Hence, we find substantial fiscal capacity available, even if these are
not reflected in past funding or may be politically unfeasible. We now turn to the question
of whether this available fiscal capacity is adequate to meet the costs associated with
national estimated disaster risk, especially when indirect effects are considered.
3.2. Estimates of disaster risk in Australia
Based on the AUS-DIS database we estimated extreme value distributions, both GEV (Defi-
nition 1) and GPD (Definition 2), for insured, direct, and total (direct and indirect) losses. As
the government budget planning process is done on an annual basis, we estimated annual
loss distributions, which include a sum of all losses from all-hazard loss events experienced
in each year. Hence, the loss distributions are for multi-hazards; this is considered appro-
priate since our analysis is concerned with fiscal coping, irrespective of the specific hazard
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event causing the losses. The summed-up annual losses were used as the input data for
the extreme value statistical analysis, which then generated the annual loss distributions.
Before applying EVT one first needs to test for the stationarity of the normalized
data. This means one needs to investigate whether there was a trend in disaster
losses over time, for instance, due to climate change. To test for stationarity an aug-
mented Dickey Fuller Test was performed for the data; this produced some indications
for non-stationarity (e.g. an upward trend in annual losses). However, the alternative
non-parametric Phillips Perron tests suggested stationarity. Given the normalization pro-
cedure already applied to the data (see Ladds et al., 2017 for details), it may be the case
that climate change effects indeed account for a possible non-stationarity trend in the
time-series. However, the accumulation of the costs over a given year for various
hazards makes it difficult to specify the drivers of the trend. Furthermore, the rather
large events which have occurred in recent years, which contribute substantially to
the upward trend, may still only be a coincidence. We therefore assume at least
weak stationarity which allows us to apply EVT on the condition that we provide a
lower bound estimate. We argue that this is adequate since climate change effects
are predicted to increase the frequency and severity of climate hazards (and hence dis-
aster losses) only in the future (IPCC, 2012). We see this as an important additional topic
for analysis in the future but the focus in this paper is on losses and fiscal coping rather
than changes in losses over time.
To estimate the model parameters for the GEV and GP loss distributions the usual
maximum likelihood approaches were applied. Furthermore, as it is typical when apply-
ing EVT, the parameter estimates and diagnosis of model fits was largely based on
graphical analysis of relevant plots including probability plots, quantile plots, return
level plots, density plots as well as profile log-likelihood plots (for a discussion of
these techniques see Embrechts et al., 2013). We then used the estimated parameters
as starting values for an optimization algorithm which gradually adapted the par-
ameters to the best fit with the empirical distribution, using the minimum distance
to the empirical distribution as the objective function. This was performed to test
the robustness of the parameter estimates, e.g. large deviations would indicate esti-
mation problems using maximum likelihood. The results for this comparison are
shown in Figure 3. The figure indicates that the differences between the empirical,
maximum likelihood and GEV distributions are quite small. We therefore preceded
with the GEV estimates as shown in Table 2.
As discussed above, the estimated extreme value loss distribution is required for risk
management considerations. In addition to the distribution based on reported losses
shown in Figure 3, annual loss distributions were estimated in the same way using
insured and total losses data. With these distributions we were able to determine the prob-
ability of past annual loss levels. For example, according to our calculations, the reported
loss events in 2011 with costs of around 13.4 billion USD are rather a frequent occurrence,
with an annual return period of 30 years. Annual total losses in the magnitude of 2011
(26.5 billion USD) would happen on average every 24 years. It should be noted that
these estimates include all natural hazard events and therefore these figures represent
the multi-hazard situation. Having these losses in a probabilistic sense, it is now possible
to combine these loss estimates with the information of possible resources to finance
them within a risk-layer approach, as discussed next.
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3.3. Risk layers for Australia
Given the estimates of available fiscal resources outlined in Section 3.1, together with the
annual loss distributions estimated above, we are now able to estimate Australia’s fiscal
coping capacity within the context of risk layers. Based on all three loss distributions
(reported, insured and total losses), we find that the large losses seen in 2011 due to
Figure 2. Responsibilities and financing natural disaster for Australia. Source: Adapted after NDFA
(2014a, 2014b).
Figure 3. Empirical distribution (blue), estimated GEV distribution based on ML (green) and GEV dis-
tribution based on minimum distance to the empirical distribution in red. Data: total losses.
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widespread flooding across the country, are all within the 20 to 30 year risk layer, which is
quite low and therefore can be expected quite frequently. More extreme events, such as a
100-year annual loss event would incur much higher losses, for example, reported losses of
around 24.8 billion USD and total losses in excess of 80 billion USD.
Recall that above we estimated that under an optimistic scenario the government could
raise 26 billion USD in a given year. If we assume that only half of the losses would be
financed by the government (an assumption which may not be too far from reality, see
Lugeri, Kundzewicz, Genovese, Hochrainer, & Radziejewski, 2010), we find Australia able
to finance direct losses up to the 400 year event. However, it is well known that taking
loans for financing disasters in Australia is not currently seen as politically acceptable,
therefore when we considering only the 10 billion USD from budget diversion a different
picture emerges. In more detail, again assuming for illustration purposes the government
takes half of the reported losses and uses only budget diversion, the 80 year loss return
period instead of the at least 400 year event would be the threshold level for having bud-
getary problems as a result of disasters.
When we conduct the analysis again using the loss distributions derived from total
cost data (both direct and indirect effects), the results change considerably. Even under
the assumption of an optimistic finance scenario, when indirect costs are taken into
account we find that the government would only be able to finance losses up to
approximately the 15 year loss event level. In other words, while for direct risk the gov-
ernment is estimated to be exposed only to medium or high risk, if indirect losses are
included financing problems emerge even at the low risk layers. Therefore, when indir-
ect effects are taken into account we find justification for sovereign risk aversion, even
for lower risk layers.
Let us now take a closer look again at the Arrow-Lind perspective. Instead of estimating
financial resources to cope with an event for different risk layers, another approach is to
look at the ability of governments to spread risk over the whole population, therefore ren-
dering individual risk negligible. This is the current implicit approach for Australia, which is
focusing on possible increases in tax revenue to finance losses (see NDFA, 2014a, 2014b).
How effective would this instrument be for the estimated risk? One way to explore this
question is to compare the estimated annual losses to the annual gross domestic
product (GPD), tax revenue or gross domestic savings (GDS). The current Australian GDP
is around 1,454,000 million USD, and tax revenue and GDS are around 309,846 and
349,122 million USD, respectively (World Bank, 2016). Table 2 shows what percentage of
GDP/tax revenue/GDS losses represent, for different loss return periods. Percentages are
shown for both reported losses and total losses estimates.
Table 2. Loss return periods and comparison to macro-economic performance measures.
Return period 20 50 100 250 400 500
Reported losses
Loss/GDP 0.36 0.59 0.85 1.38 1.76 1.98
Loss/tax 1.68 2.78 4.01 6.48 8.27 9.28
Loss/savings 1.49 2.46 3.56 5.75 7.34 8.24
Total/direct and indirect losses
Loss/GDP 1.69 3.16 5.04 9.32 12.75 14.80
Loss/tax 7.91 14.83 23.68 43.75 59.86 69.46
Loss/savings 7.02 13.17 21.02 38.83 53.13 61.65
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Examining the ratio of GDP/tax revenue/GDS and reported losses, it appears that Aus-
tralia is well equipped to handle direct losses, at least from a risk-spreading perspective.
Even for the 500 year loss event, estimated direct losses are still below 2% of GDP and
loss to savings and taxes are still below or around 5% for the middle-layer risk. When indir-
ect effects are included by utilizing total loss estimates, the situation worsens considerably.
For example, the loss to GDP ratio climbs to nearly 15% for the 500-year event, with a con-
siderable amount of taxes and savings required to finance the loss. As we saw in Section
3.1 when looking at past financing of disaster losses via NDRRA and AGDRP, even the high
losses experienced to date are rather low in comparison to actual risk exposed.
In order to investigate these results further and to test the robustness of our findings,
we took a closer look at the fiscal risk side of the estimates using the loss distribution based
on the insured loss data. In the Australian government productivity commission report on
national disaster funding arrangements (NDFA, 2014a) a regression type of approach
linking insurance losses with fiscal requirements is presented. They estimate the following
relationship (NDFA, 2014b):
Fiscal costs(t)=−$712million + 0.502insurance losses(t)+ 0.670insurance losses (t− 1).
Insured losses in the same period and up to two lags (in years) of insured losses were
mainly used because after a natural disaster insurance payouts generally occur relatively
quickly, while government expenditure can happen over several years. While the overall
fit was good the relationship should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, we used this
equation and our loss distribution to estimate fiscal risk. To set up this analysis we
needed to sample from our estimated insured losses distribution for year t and year t−
1, which was performed with a Monte–Carlo sampling technique using the inverse trans-
formation method (a sampling method based on the distribution function estimated, see
Klugman, Panjer, & Willmot, 2008). A total of 1,00,000 sample points were generated in this
way and again used to estimate a fiscal cost distribution (again using a GEV). The results
were found to be in line with the original analysis and findings above.
4. Discussion
The analysis presented here is based on the assumption that national governments are
responsible – via explicit or implicit liabilities – for all or part of the costs associated
with direct and indirect impacts of possible disaster events. Our analysis finds substantial
fiscal and economic risks associated with disasters in Australia. Australia is subject to sub-
stantial and unacknowledged risk, which poses a significant threat to government fiscal
stability and medium to long-term economic growth. Instead of using a modelling
approach for calculating the indirect risk, we applied extreme value statistics to a recently
produced dataset of direct and indirect losses for Australia. This enabled us to apply a risk-
based comparison of financing needs for all potential hazard events on the country level,
for direct and indirect risks. With a so-called risk-layer approach we were able to dis-
tinguish between different probabilities of events and corresponding losses, and loss
financing resources. Our analysis finds that it is indirect impacts which are the key
concern for Australia. Hence, there is a clear need for investment in the reduction of indir-
ect risks, not only direct ones, and indirect risks are already a concern for the more fre-
quent events (or low risk layers).
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From a risk-layer perspective one could argue that direct risks, while having the poten-
tial to be colossal, both from an Arrow-Lind perspective as well as financing perspective,
for Australia only the high risk layer is seen as problematic. However, when indirect losses
are included, while the low risk layer may still be seen as unproblematic, in the cases of
both the middle- and high-risk layers we find serious challenges in terms of loss spreading
abilities as well as loss financing possibilities. Therefore, Australia may be financially pre-
pared to deal with the direct costs of disasters; however, it will have problems with indirect
losses (measured through total losses) that occur for the medium and high-risk layers, e.g.
above the 20-year annual loss event scenarios. Consequently, there should be some reflec-
tion and focus on how to decrease these indirect losses in the future through appropriate
risk management measures tackling this specific issue.
It is important to note that government measures to mitigate indirect losses may not
necessarily be constrained by financial constraints or fiscal losses, but instead by economic
aspects. These include economic resource constraints (e.g. limited number of tradesper-
sons and/or materials in case of a disaster), redundancies in the economic system (e.g.
number of independent businesses and communication channels within a sector), the
degree of slack resources due to economic cycles (e.g. a disaster during a recession will
have different impacts compared when it happens during a growth period) or more gen-
erally on the economic resilience of the country (Rose, 2007). Recent events such as the
Tohoku earthquake in Japan as well as the Christchurch event in New Zealand have
shown the importance of not only the magnitude of direct losses and financing resources
available, but also of the economic situation in which they occur (Cavallo & Noy, 2009; Noy
et al., 2017).
5. Conclusions
Our analysis concludes that indirect effects are potentially a game changer for risk analysis
and risk management decision-making. It has long been hypothesized that direct effects
are a primary concern for developing countries, with indirect effects being more promi-
nent in developed countries. Until now expected annual loss distributions have not
included indirect effects because of a lack of data. The AUS-DIS database allowed us to
undertake this analysis for Australia considering indirect effects, and found support for
the hypothesis that indirect effects, while typically ignored, are a more prominent
concern for risk management in a developed country context. We find this despite the
fact that the AUS-DIS database has only partial coverage of indirect effects –with no cover-
age of heatwaves – so our analysis presents a very conservative scenario.
Australia, and presumably many similar developed countries, are unaware of their level
of risk relative to their capacity to finance expected losses. Our analysis finds support for a
more risk-averse approach, in particular, for the rarer and more extreme events, and for
targeted increased investment in (a) risk reduction to reduce current existing risks (correc-
tive risk reduction), and (b) avoiding the creation of new or increased risk (prospective risk
reduction). In particular we suggest increased investment in understanding and prevent-
ing the occurrence of indirect losses. Using a risk-layering approach, we were able to dis-
tinguish sovereign risk preference (risk-averse or risk-neutral) for Australia for each risk
layer. When considering direct risk only, we found that Australia should behave risk neu-
trally for frequent and medium-term risks, and risk averse for extreme risk. When we
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included indirect impacts, we found Australia should behave risk averse even for low and
for medium risks. The more risk-averse approach advocated for by our analysis stands in
contrast to the sovereign preference for risk neutrality put forward by the Arrow-Lind
Theorem. This is due to the reality of constraints on resources for financing disaster
losses faced by Australia, which violates the assumptions underpinning Arrow-Lind in
the case of inclusion of indirect effects.
The application of EVT along with the risk-layering approach for indirect risk is a new
contribution to the field. Using this approach, we were able to use a country-level
dataset, as opposed to the extremely data intensive catastrophe modelling approach, to
estimate national-level risk. This kind of analysis may be especially useful for industrialized
countries who are often interested in direct and indirect national-level risks, and can typi-
cally cope with direct risk, while the potentially more problematic indirect risks are either
largely ignored or unable to be calculated. By taking a risk-layering perspective, the
approach supports a risk-based approach to investment in disaster risk management (con-
sidered best-practice in the field), by aiding in the understanding of coping potential and
optimal risk preference for different levels of risks.
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